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n April 2003, there is to be a mid-term
review of the outcomes of the United
Nations General Assembly Special Ses-
sion (UNGASS) on Drugs in 1998. The
1998 UNGASS was originally called to eval-
uate the effectiveness of the current repres-
sive drug control regime. During the prepara-
tory phase at the Commission on Narcotic
Drugs (CND), however, the effort at evalu-
ation backfired and the UNGASS was reori-
ented towards an affirmation of prohibition-
ism, despite the obvious failure of current
drug control policies. The General Assembly
in their political declaration gave the UN
International Drug Control Programme
(UNDCP) the mandate “…to develop strategies
with a view to eliminating or significantly reducing
the illicit cultivation of the coca bush, the cannabis
plant and the opium poppy by the year 2008”. 
Four years on, one can only conclude that the
unrealistic deadlines set at the 1998 UNGASS
have – once again – failed. This issue of Drugs
& Conflict analyses the possibilities and obsta-
cles for change of international drug control
as a contribution towards ensuring that the
2003 mid-term review of UNGASS does not
constitute another lost opportunity for eval-
uation. 
In Time for Breakthrough – Polarisation and Paral-
ysis in Global Drug Policy, TNI fellow Martin Jels-
ma describes the increasingly divergent
trends in global drug policies.  On the one
hand, there is an escalation in the US-driven
War on Drugs, creating a drug gulag domes-
tically, increasing and militarising forced erad-
ication abroad. On the other hand, in Europe
and several like-minded countries a more
flexible and pragmatic approach has gained
ground in domestic drug policy-making, tak-
ing distance from indiscriminate repression
and the zero-tolerance approach. In these
countries, the trend towards greater lenien-
cy has become irreversible and rational think-
ing is gradually replacing the dogmas of the
past. The stark polarisation of these two
main trends, however, has led to paralysis at
the UN level. The key question now is how
to achieve a breakthrough.
In Habits of a Hegemon – The United States and
the Future of the Global Drug Prohibition Regime,
David Bewley-Taylor analyses the growing
dissatisfaction with the UN drug control sys-
tem. Nations from around the world have
implemented, or seriously discussed, harm
reduction measures that attempt to work
within the legal confines of global drug pro-
hibition. As the limits of these efforts are
reached, there is a realisation that the UN
Drug Conventions pose a major obstacle to
the introduction of pragmatic policies at a
national level. Further progress will only be
possible either through some sort of change
in or defection from the regime. Any such
move would certainly encounter considerable
hostility. As its staunchest defender, it is the
United States that maintains the disciplinary
framework. Nations wishing to expand
national policy space by operating beyond the
confines of the conventions are faced with
several possible paths. These all have their
own problems and none can be realistically
considered without reference to the US.
The wisdom of the UN Drug Conventions is
increasingly being questioned. In May, the
House of Commons Home Affairs Select
Committee in the United Kingdom released
its report The Government’s Drugs Policy: Is It
Working?. In this report, the Committee con-
cluded “...we believe the time has come for the
international treaties to be reconsidered” and rec-
ommended that “...the Government initiates a dis-
cussion within the Commission on Narcotic Drugs
of alternative ways – including the possibility of
legalisation and regulation – to tackle the global
drugs dilemma.” Chris Mullin, the chairman of
the Committee, said “attempts to combat ille-
gal drugs by means of law enforcement have
proved so manifestly unsuccessful that it is difficult
to argue for the status quo.” One can only hope
that the international community and the
UN will follow the lead of the UK Commit-
tee and initiate a serious evaluation with a
view to the development of more humane,
just and effective drug policies.
he big trends in drug policy over the
past decade reveal two opposing ten-
dencies: one tends towards tolerance
and pragmatism and has its centre of
gravity in Europe, while the other under US guid-
ance tries to reinvigorate a zero-tolerance men-
tality using more repressive means. The polari-
sation has led to paralysis on the UN level. A
more assertive European role, combined with
the UNDCP reform process and the evaluation
in April 2003 could provide an opportunity for
a breakthrough.
These diverging trends start from a shared
recognition that all combined efforts thus far –
eradication, crop substitution, drug seizures,
demand reduction – have failed in terms of
global impact. There may be a wealth of good
practices on the local level, but there is barely
any reduction in either supply of or demand for
illicit drugs. In the consumption markets, whole-
sale and retail prices show a downward trend
while purity is rising, which means there is no
shortage on the market. Consumption patterns
and youth culture fashions are continuously
changing but there is no indication that overall
levels of consumption of illicit substances are
diminishing.
Some conclude that this recognition should lead
to a global evaluation: re-assessment of the
applied principles, opening of the debate, more
space for experimentation with other approach-
es and a focus on more realistic aims in terms
of reducing drug-related harms. Others, how-
ever, maintain that the reason the ‘medicine’ has
not worked is that not enough has been applied
and that the logical response should be to apply
a stronger dose: re-affirm political commitment,
oppose any tolerance, close ranks behind a ‘get-
serious’ approach, set deadlines and don’t be
afraid to dirty your hands to achieve concrete
results, “A drug free world – We can do it!”
At the UN level, the polarisation has caused
paralysis. The United Nations International Drug
Control Programme (UNDCP) has actively pro-
moted the re-affirm discourse, suffocating
attempts to open up the debate, censoring crit-
ical remarks in its own publications, trumpeting
doubtful success stories, and punishing dissent-
ing views among its staff.1 The International Nar-
cotics Control Board (INCB) has maintained a
very strict interpretation of the UN conventions
and regularly appears to overstep its limited
mandate by passing judgement on sovereign
states whose policies take a slightly different
direction and exercising pressure on them to get
back in line. As for the UN Commission on Nar-
cotic Drugs (CND), it is clear the more liberal-
minded countries are taking a low profile. Care-
ful not to fuel tensions that might endanger care-
fully conquered ground for experimentation,
they opt to keep the debate as general and diplo-
matic as possible, avoiding open controversy in
the CND over their policy directions.
The 1998 UNGASS on Drugs
The polarisation between the divergent trends
became visible at the United Nations General
Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on Drugs,
which took place in June 1998. The UNGASS
motto ‘A Drug Free World – We can do it!’ recy-
cled the illusion that with sufficient commitment
and a bold strategy it was possible to eliminate
illicit drugs from the planet completely. To reach
that goal, during the months before UNGASS,
UNDCP elaborated an ambitious plan called
SCOPE, the Strategy for Coca and Opium Poppy
Elimination by 2008.2
UNDCP expected UNGASS to approve SCOPE,
which called for a mix of alternative development
projects and eradication operations wiping out
illicit crops in Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Burma,
Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
eight countries where coca and opium produc-
tion is concentrated: “After three decades of
experience, the international community is now
equipped with tested methodologies and the know-
how to tackle the problem in the producing areas.
The strengthening of the drug control mechanisms
in the regions concerned has paved the way for full-
scale interventions and most producing countries
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1 Letter of Resignation to Mr Pino Arlacchi, by Michael vd. Schulenberg, Director Division for Operations and Analysis – UNDCP,
December 4, 2000.
2 For a detailed critique of SCOPE, see: Tom Blickman, Caught in the Cross-fire: Developing Countries, the UNDCP and the War on Drugs,
TNI/CIIR, London, June 1998. 
have adopted well-defined national strategies and
action plans that are ready for implementation.”3
The SCOPE plan, however, was not endorsed by
the General Assembly. At the Vienna prepara-
tory meetings, the proposal was criticised harsh-
ly by several member states, which prevented
the plan even getting onto the UNGASS agen-
da. SCOPE disappeared from UNDCP docu-
ments and no longer exists today. The Political
Declaration from UNGASS still reflected some
of its principles, by welcoming “the global
approach by the United Nations International Drug
Control Programme to the elimination of illicit crops”
and stating that all countries should commit “to
working closely with the Programme to develop
strategies with a view to eliminating or reducing sig-
nificantly the illicit cultivation of the coca bush, the
cannabis plant and the opium poppy by the year
2008.”4
After having lost the opportunity to use
UNGASS to re-assess current anti-drug policies,
several countries tried to safeguard the concept
of ‘shared responsibility’ between the North and
South, developed in the eighties. They pressed
for the elaboration of an Action Plan for demand
reduction, which should achieve measurable
results by 2003, acknowledging the basic fact that
if the world is not able to reduce demand for
illicit drugs, it is an illusion to think that supply
can be eliminated.
A New Escalation in the US
Around this same period (1997/98), a ‘re-affir-
mation’ push was taking place in the United
States. Pressure increased to intensify the chem-
ical War on Drugs worldwide, while the US
Congress allocated resources for the promotion
of a biological front. The SCOPE vision and the
target date of the year 2008 set by UNGASS
blended with the aggressive nature of the West-
ern Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act (approved by
US Congress in October 1998) into grand mas-
ter plans for the Andean region. The offensive
focused on Bolivia - the With Dignity! plan - and
on Colombia, with massive aerial spraying oper-
ations under the aegis of Plan Colombia, the
Andean Regional Initiative and recently the inclu-
sion of Colombia in the global war on terrorism.
On the consumption side of the drug chain, an
escalation also became visible. During the
nineties, a record number of people were arrest-
ed in the US for consumption (something already
decriminalised in many countries around the
world) or for possession of small quantities.
Human Rights Watch calls for “the need to move
beyond the war on drugs and to begin to dismantle
the racially unjust ‘drug gulag’ it has spawned.”5
“Human Rights Watch does not challenge the pub-
lic’s decision to use criminal sanctions in its effort to
curtail drug abuse and drug trafficking. But the use
of the criminal sentences is subject to important
human rights constraints. To be consistent with
internationally recognized human rights standards,
criminal sanctions must be both humane and pro-
portional to the gravity of the offense.”6 The dra-
matic prison situation, the rapid spread of HIV
in the absence of a clean needle policy, and the
effects of the extremely repressive policy
approach especially on black communities is
contested by broad social sectors. 
Europe Takes Distance
In Europe, meanwhile, another approach gained
ground. Expected to contribute the alternative
development components to accompany the
escalation in the Andes, Europe instead took dis-
tance from the US-led War on Drugs. The blur-
ring of lines between development and eradica-
tion, environmental concerns over chemical
spraying, and the over-emphasised military force
in the ‘carrot and stick’ balance, made European
donors reluctant. US officials expressed their
disappointment: “Everyone was looking for the rest
of the world, particularly the Europeans, to do the
soft side. We have done the military side. You can’t
do one without the other.”7 Apart from verbal dis-
agreements and donor reluctance, Europe has
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3 CND, An International Strategy to Eliminate the Illicit Cultivation of Coca Bush and Opium Poppy: Progress Report, E/CN.7/1998/PC/CRP.4,
Vienna, March 3, 1998.
4 UNGASS, Political Declaration, 9th Plenary Meeting, A/RES/S-20/2, June 10, 1998.
5 HRW, Punishment and Prejudice: Racial Disparities in the War on Drugs, Human Rights Watch US, May 2000.
6 HRW, Reforming the Rockefeller Drug laws, Website editorial at: www.hrw.org/campaigns/drugs/
7 “Europe’s Aid Plan for Colombia Falls Short of Drug War’s Goals,” New York Times, October 25, 2000.
been also reluctant to directly challenge the US
and has had great difficulty defining an alterna-
tive policy framework for the drugs production
side. 
Domestically, however, the Harm Reduction
concept has spread very fast in recent years and
has now become the basis
for a rational and pragmat-
ic drug policy in almost
every European Union
country and several others
like Australia, New Zealand,
Canada and Brazil. Practices
like decriminalisation of
consumption, leniency in
law enforcement towards
cannabis and towards pos-
session of other drugs for personal use, and nee-
dle exchange programmes are commonplace
nowadays. The more controversial steps further
along the path of leniency, like the ‘coffee shops’,
heroin maintenance programmes, XTC testing,
etc, have received acceptance beyond the pio-
neer countries, Switzerland and the Nether-
lands, and are under consideration or in prepa-
ration in several other countries. Compared
with the tense situation at the time of the 1992
Maastricht Treaty, Europe has advanced rapidly
on these issues. In several countries, debates are
now taking place that openly question the wis-
dom of prohibition of cannabis products and
open up the discussion to look at legal models
for the regulation of that illicit market. 
Room for Manoeuvre
There is no question that sooner or later the
tolerance trend guided by the Harm Reduction
philosophy will run into the limitations of the UN
conventions. It already touches the very edges
of the letter and spirit of some articles. All steps
taken thus far are defendable in that they adhere
to the 1961 Single Convention as well as most
of the stricter obligations agreed to in the 1988
Vienna Convention.8 Still, the INCB warns in its
2001 report of an increasing tension between
expanding tolerance practices and strict adher-
ence.9 If the countries committed to the search
for pragmatic solutions want to advance any fur-
ther, it is becoming urgent that they begin to
question openly the straitjacket of the conven-
tions. The obstacle to considering any changes
in that direction is the consensus-driven func-
tioning of the CND.
With the current polar-
isation, it is difficult to
imagine that any agree-
ment could be reached. 
Among the fervent
defenders of the prohi-
bitionist regime, too,
considerable differences
exist as to the cultural
and political roots of
their zero-tolerance position. In Sweden, for
example, it is primarily rooted in a social demo-
cratic tradition where the state is supposed to
protect its citizenry against any threat perceived
to undermine the fabric of society. In predomi-
nantly Moslem countries, the rise of Islamic fun-
damentalism and the accompanying strong reli-
gious laws against any drugs, including alcohol,
has resulted in stronger opposition from those
states to any deviation from zero-tolerance
within the CND. Several African cannabis-pro-
ducing countries are taking strong positions
because they aspire to be included in special
preferential trade mechanisms and develop-
mental aid schemes tied to drug control objec-
tives already in place for several Latin American
and Asian countries. Then there is the United
States, the principle force promoting a global
prohibitionist regime, which has a zero-tolerance
position rooted in Christian fundamentalism
and an aspiration to world leadership, leading it
to blur the drugs issue with other foreign poli-
cy and security agendas. 
With this blend of motives dominating the re-
affirm camp, there is little possibility of negoti-
ating a new consensus on the basis of rational-
ity and pragmatism. There may still be possibil-
ities, however, to break the impasse at the UN
level and expand space for policy diversity while
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8 Nicholas Dorn and Alison Jamieson, Room for Manoeuvre – Overview Report, DrugScope, London, March 2000; and B. De Ruyver, G.
Vermeulen, T. Vander Beken, F. Vander Laenen and K. Geenens, Multidisciplinary Drug Policies and the UN Drug Treaties, IRCP, Maklu,
Antwerpen/Apeldoorn, 2002.
9 INCB, Report 2001, E/INCB/2001/1, UN, New York, 2002.
The trend towards more
leniency has become
irreversible and rational
thinking is gradually
replacing the dogmas of
the past. 
avoiding the necessity to reach a new consen-
sus. The CND practice of proceeding strictly on
the basis of consensus was adopted only when
the US lost its voting power for not having paid
their UN dues. CND resolutions do not nec-
essarily require consensus and can be helpful to
clarify the interpretation of provisions of the
conventions and to stretch the latitude countries
have to develop a different national drug policy.
With regard to formal amendments to the con-
ventions themselves, all parties do have to agree.
Ultimately, the only formal escape route out of
the consensus stalemate here would be for
countries to denounce the conventions. Infor-
mally, groups of countries can choose to test the
boundaries of UN conventions by taking the
leniency approach beyond the point where this
could be justified under the internationally
agreed drug control principles, and then ‘just
take the heat’. Clearly, only some countries can
afford politically to play with those margins.
The INCB may not have the mandate or power
to impose any sanctions, but the US still main-
tains its disciplinary system of certification and
has several instruments of pressure. These
obstacles are further explored in the other arti-
cle in this edition.
The divergent global policy trends are starting
to lead to serious inconsistencies. At the CND
in March this year, Morocco, for example, raised
questions about the possible implications of the
lenient cannabis consumption policy trend in
Europe for Morocco’s policy with regards to its
own vast cannabis cultivation. According to the
INCB Report 2001: “It is disturbing that, while
many developing countries have been devoting
resources to the eradication of cannabis and to fight-
ing illicit trafficking in the drug, certain developed
countries have, at the same time, decided to toler-
ate the cultivation of, trade in and abuse of
cannabis.” Indeed, there is a contradiction
between liberalisation on the consumption side
while maintaining or even increasing interna-
tional pressure to eradicate drugs crops in tra-
ditional production regions of the South. These
Southern countries are allowed much less polit-
ical space to re-assess their own national poli-
cy and enter a path towards pragmatic solutions.
Moreover, the international conventions allow
less flexibility for the production side as com-
pared to the consumption side.
UNDCP Reform
Being the leading multilateral agency for drugs
issues, the functioning of UNDCP in all these
matters is crucial. The agency not only imple-
ments UN programmes and advises many coun-
tries on drug policy matters, it also functions as
the secretariat for both the INCB and the CND.
The agency went through a deep crisis these past
years. The UN Office of Internal Oversight Ser-
vices (OIOS) was called in to investigate mis-
management, donors lost confidence and Exec-
utive Director Pino Arlacchi had to step down
in December 2001. The combination of the
strong zero-tolerance position with bad man-
agement has meant that UNDCP has not been
able to play a moderating role amidst the grow-
ing polarisation. The recommendations of the
OIOS triggered a reform process in mid-2001
at UNDCP’s Vienna headquarters and several
organisational improvements are now well
underway. But the question remains as to
whether the UNDCP will also be able to grow
away from its politicised re-affirm position
towards becoming more of a centre of exper-
tise better able to reflect the different views on
drug policy and its application nowadays. 
One of the OIOS reports concluded: “The role
of ODCCP as a centre of expertise cannot be ful-
filled without a free exchange of views, discussions
and the involvement of staff in decision-making. How-
ever, at the time of the inspection, corporate mech-
anisms of collective advice and guidance and of pro-
gramme and policy coordination were not function-
ing. Also lacking was a consistent system for pro-
gramme oversight in the form of monitoring imple-
mentation and assessing results. (..) Thematic eval-
uations were few and had not led to much-needed
substantive discussions or changes in practice. There
was no mechanism to formulate lessons learned and
to feed them back into programme formulation and
delivery.”10
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10 OIOS, Report on the Inspection of Programme Management and Administrative Practices in the Office for Drug Control and Crime Preven-
tion, General Assembly, A/56/83, June 1, 2001 (www.un.org/Depts/oios/reports/a56_83.htm)
This goes beyond the mere organisational
reform needs that tend to become the focus
of attention in addressing the agency’s crisis.
Mr Arlacchi not only ran the office in a “high-
ly centralized and arbitrary manner,” but claimed
successes on the drugs front “beyond the limits
of credibility” – concluded the OIOS.11 He also
dragged the agency into highly questionable pro-
jects like the aborted SCOPE programme, the
Tajik Drug Control Agency, the mycoherbicide
projects for Colombia and Afghanistan, and the
‘boat project’ to which OIOS devoted a special
investigation.12 Those projects have caused con-
siderable damage to the political credibility of the
organisation. It was not only his managerial style
or the lack of transparency around projects
that was problematic, but also the policy con-
tent direction in which he took the agency. The
much-criticised World Drug Report 2000 was
a case in point, demonstrating how out of touch
the agency was with shifting opinions on inter-
national drug control. All this contributed to the
process of erosion of confidence that has taken
place among donors, and even more strongly
within the NGO and academic communities
working on drugs issues. 
In May 2002, Antonio Maria Costa arrived in
Vienna as the new Executive Director of the UN
Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
(ODCCP) and Director General of the UN
Office at Vienna (UNOV). In his very first speech
to the staff upon arrival in Vienna in May, Mr
Costa mentioned the need to be “tough in impos-
ing upon ourselves the sort of efficient monitoring
and evaluation of our work needed to restore Mem-
ber States’ confidence.” He promised to make the
values of “fairness, transparency and accountabil-
ity (..) a fundamental part of our culture.”13 These
statements combined with Mr Costa’s vast expe-
rience in the management of international organ-
isations – his latest position was secretary gen-
eral of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development – indicate his commitment to
ensure the following through of the OIOS rec-
ommendations for organisational restructuring,
transparency in decision-making about projects,
and the strengthening of the functioning of the
CND as UNDCP’s governing body.
Drugs in the UN System
In his address to the staff, Mr Costa emphasised
the connections between “drugs, crime and ter-
rorism, the evils of our time.” The 1998 step to
merge under one umbrella – ODCCP – the
UNDCP and the Centre for International Crime
Prevention (CICP) has over-emphasised the
drugs-crime connection, however intimate and
important that relationship is. As the current dis-
course adopted by most donors indicates, drugs
is a ‘cross-cutting issue’ covering many policy
areas. The drugs issue is as closely interrelated
with health or development as it is with crime.
Within the UN community, the particular rela-
tionship established between UNDCP and the
crime department – as compared with the loose
collaborative relationships with WHO, UNDP
or UNAIDS – runs the risk of leading to an
ODCCP drugs policy focus which leans more
towards a law enforcement approach than a
health or developmental approach. While most
countries have established drug policy co-ordi-
nating structures that carefully balance respon-
sibilities between the health, justice, internal and
foreign affairs departments, co-ordination on
drug-related issues within the UN system is, in
this sense, out of kilter. 
This has led to conflicting views and policies on
the drugs issue within the UN community, and
between UNDCP and major donors. The
WHO’s rational approach from a purely health
perspective, which treats licit and illicit sub-
stances alike, regularly conflicts with the vision
emanating from the UNDCP offices. While
UNAIDS is actively promoting needle exchange
programmes to prevent the spread of HIV,
UNDCP – though a cosponsor of UNAIDS
since 1999 – twists and turns to avoid direct
involvement with such programmes. While 70%
of UNDCP funding comes from European
sources, where Harm Reduction has become an
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11OIOS, Report  on the Triennial Review of the Implementation of the Recommendations Made by the Committee for Programme and Coordi-
nation at its Thirty-Eighth Session on the In-depth Evaluation of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, ECOSOC,
E/AC.51/2001/4, May 4, 2001 (www.un.org/Depts/oios/reports/eac51_2001_4.pdf)
12 OIOS, Report on the Investigation into Allegation of Misconduct and Mismanagement of the “Boat Project” at the United Nations Office for
Drug Control and Crime Prevention, General Assembly, A/56/689, December 7, 2001 (www.un.org/Depts/oios/reports/a56_689.pdf)
13 Address to All ODCCP and UNOV Staff by Antonio Maria Costa Director-General and Executive Director, Vienna, May 7, 2002.
accepted pillar of drugs policies (except in Swe-
den), this is still forbidden territory for UNDCP,
which even bans discussion of the concept. An
evaluation process is required which addresses
such contradictions while also re-examining the
organisational embedding of the drugs issue in
the UN system.
The UNGASS Mid-term Review
The mid-term UNGASS review could provide a
new opportunity to achieve a breakthrough. A
two-day ministerial segment will be included in
next year’s CND session, scheduled for 8-16
April 2003 in Vienna, to evaluate progress made
with regard to the goals and targets set out in
the Political Declaration of the 1998 UNGASS.
The review provides the first global opportuni-
ty since the UNGASS to re-assess and adjust the
current international drugs policy framework.
UNDCP will play a crucial role in preparing for
the review. The Executive Director presents
biennial reports to the CND on progress of the
UNGASS outcomes,14 which will form the basis
for the evaluation in April 2003. The UNGASS
mid-term review will present Mr Costa with a
high-level political opportunity to convince the
world of his commitment to take UNDCP in a
more rational direction, to say farewell to the
years of crisis, to restore donor confidence and
to open up the debate. 
A necessary pre-condition for a breakthrough,
however, will be political will and a concerted
effort from those countries interested to pur-
sue the path of pragmatism and conscious of the
need to conquer more space on the UN level
for national policy differentiation. This includes
European countries like the Netherlands,
Switzerland, Portugal, Germany, Belgium and the
UK alongside like-minded countries like Cana-
da and Australia, possibly with support from
members of the GRULAC block of Latin Amer-
ican and Caribbean countries like Mexico, Brazil,
Jamaica, Uruguay and Peru. Differences aside,
policy developments in these countries demon-
strate a common interest in lifting internation-
al drug control out of its present stalemate
towards policies which offer more room for
manoeuvre in the implementation of realistic and
pragmatic policies. The time has come for the
European countries leading this way to become
more assertive about their achievements, to
bring this refreshing tone to the UN level and
to support – in the spirit of co-responsibility –
those Southern countries that are eager to take
steps in a similar direction also for the produc-
tion side.
Mexico has been elected to preside over that
mid-term UNGASS review and its preparations.
Mexico is the country that originally called for
the 1998 UNGASS, aspiring to convene a forum
for in-depth evaluation of global drug control
policy. In the opening statement for the 46th
CND session, Mexico recalled some of its orig-
inal spirit in saying, in reference to the 2003 and
2008 deadlines, “in this period of sessions we will
be very critical about these ambitious goals. [..]
Above all, we must be honest and not self-indulgent.
To report about achievements where there have
been none neutralize those that we have genuinely
reached.”15
A rational guiding principle for the mid-term
review can be found, perhaps, in the conclusions
reached by the New York County Lawyers’
Association: “The appropriate goal of any drug pol-
icy must be to decrease the prevalence and spread
of harmful drug use and substance abuse, and to
minimize the harms associated with such problems
where they are found to exist. Additionally, any pol-
icy which creates more harmful results than the soci-
etal problems it proposes to solve, must be re-eval-
uated in terms of the advisability of further pursuit
of such policy. Further, to justify continuation of any
public policy, the costs incurred must always be
weighed against the benefits derived. It is within this
context, and with these criteria in mind, that pre-
sent approaches to drug policy must be objectively
assessed and, where appropriate, alternative mod-
els for future policy evaluated and considered.”16
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s dissatisfaction with the prohibi-
tion oriented UN drug control
system builds, increasing numbers
of states are reviewing their stance
on the international treaties. The
Netherlands is no longer isolated in testing
the boundaries of the Conventions. Recent
years have seen nations from around the
world implement, or seriously discuss, harm
reduction measures that work ‘within’ the
legal confines of the global drug prohibition
regime. With such a trend, however, comes
the realisation that the Conventions still stand
as a major obstacle to the introduction of
pragmatic policies at a national level. While
the tolerant approaches adopted by a num-
ber of nations have
undoubtedly weakened the
current regime, it seems
that further progress will
only be possible either
through some sort of
change in or defection
from the regime.  
Any such move would cer-
tainly encounter consider-
able hostility. As noted in the previous arti-
cle, a major obstacle to considering any
changes in that direction is the consensus-dri-
ven functioning of the CND. An important
force sustaining such consensus is the Unit-
ed States. As its staunchest defender, it is the
US that maintains the regime’s disciplinary
framework. Pressure from Washington has
long supplemented the moral legitimacy
bestowed upon the doctrine of prohibition by
the UN.1 This has produced a formidable
source of inertia. Through the strategy of
issue linkage, the US has certainly exploited
its hegemonic status for the defence of the
global drug prohibition regime it has worked
so hard to construct.2 This UN-US alliance
has made it difficult for nations to deviate sig-
nificantly, or even to discuss deviation, from
the doctrine of prohibition. Since the 1980s,
the US has used certification as an important
vehicle for economic persuasion. The annual
process has also been strengthened in recent
years by Washington’s efforts to conflate its
war on drugs with the transnational fight
against organised crime.3 Such a move
increases the reputational implications of devi-
ation. Similarly, US moves to fuse the drug war
with the new war on terror makes movement
away from the prohibitive regime potentially
damaging for a nation’s international image. 
Clearly, when considering any change at the
UN level, it would be unwise for nations to
ignore the US’s habitual use of hegemonic
power to protect
global drug prohibi-
tion. Beyond prosely-
tization, maintenance
of the regime is
important because it
helps Washington to
legitimise both
domestic policies and
many overseas activi-
ties. The aim of this
article then is to explore, within the context
of possible US reaction, some of the options
available to nations wishing to create more
policy space at a national level. As I hope to
show, moves to initiate regime change with-
in the confines of international law are prob-
lematic. A consequence of this may see
nations withdrawing, whether legitimately or
otherwise in terms of international law, from
one or all of the drug control conventions.
Like other moves to deviate from prohibition,
this would undoubtedly provoke a hostile
response from the US. Nonetheless, the
recent ‘America First’ policies of the Bush II
administration may offer increased scope for
manoeuvre. Washington’s abandonment of
multilateralism in a number of key interna-
tional areas has highlighted what Bruce Cronin
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The Conventions stand as
a major obstacle to the
introduction of pragmatic
policies at a national
level.
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has called the Paradox of Hegemony: the ten-
sion that exists between a hegemon’s multi-
lateral responsibilities and a desire and mate-
rial capability to act unilaterally.4 As will be
argued, while bringing difficulties of its own,
such a paradox greatly undermines Washing-
ton’s capacity to act as the enforcer for the
UN drug control apparatus.
Modification of the Treaties
The re-scheduling of substances is one pos-
sible method parties could use to create
more space for movement within the current
regime. This is an option often discussed in
relation to cannabis. This is especially the case
since the WHO recently announced that it
would be “very pleased to consider scientific data”
on the drug. As the WHO noted, the Single
Convention outlines conditions for the
changes in the scope of international control.
Article 3 allows for amendments to the list of
classified substances and the system accom-
panying them. The WHO or any contracting
party can initiate the modification process at
any time. This is a legitimate course of action.
At the practical level, however, it is far from
straightforward. 
It can be taken as a given that any move
towards modification would provoke US dis-
pleasure and attempts to discredit and ‘per-
suade’ parties to refrain from such action.
Nonetheless, fundamental problems do exist
with regard to the legal status of the cultiva-
tion of ‘natural drugs.’ As the International
Anti-Prohibition League noted in 1994,
according to the text of the commentary to
the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances, cannabis and cannabis resin “…could
be deleted by the Commission [on Narcotic Drugs]
from the Schedules of the Single Convention and
indeed be withdrawn from the control instituted by
this Convention with respect to drugs, with the
exception of the measures of control mentioned in
article 26 and article 28 paragraph 1” (emphasis
added).5 To be sure, the retention of these
unaltered articles means that any changes
resulting from the reclassification of cannabis
would not include provisions concerning cul-
tivation. The CND, therefore, would be
unable to abolish the prohibition of cultivation
since it is entrenched in specific articles of the
1961 legislation. Only an amendment to the
Single Convention could achieve revision.
Such a situation clearly limits the utility of the
rescheduling route. While other drugs could
theoretically be re-scheduled according to
procedures laid out in Article 3 of the Single
Convention, changes relating to cannabis (as
well as the coca leaf and opium) would be
greatly limited. 
Concerns surrounding the issue of cultivation
may be purely academic considering the con-
siderable systemic obstacles that stand in the
way of reclassification. While the WHO plays
a central role in the rescheduling process the
body can only make non-binding recommen-
dations. The power to make any changes in
classification initially belongs to the CND.
The current state of the Commission makes
it unlikely that sufficient support for re-sched-
uling would be forthcoming. The complex
dynamics of the 53-member body creates
considerable inertia resisting any significant
change within the regime. Additionally, while
perhaps not as dominant as in earlier years,
the US still plays an important role in influ-
encing the direction taken by the Commis-
sion. As a diplomat at the UN in Vienna
observed only a few years ago “Wherever a
nation seems about to break ranks [with Wash-
ington’s views on prohibition] the US will be there,
cajoling or threatening.”6 Under such circum-
stances even the necessary majority, rather
than a consensus, decision required to
approve re-scheduling may prove unobtain-
able. 
And yet, even if the WHO or a party were
to make a recommendation concerning
reclassification and the CND were to accept
it, Article 3 has other means for blocking pos-
sibilities. In accordance with paragraph 8 (a)
only one party has to make a request for the
Commission’s decision to be taken to the
ECOSOC for review. The Council then has
the authority to confirm, alter or reject the
decision of the CND. The ECOSOC’s deci-
sion is final. This clause could easily be invoked
by the US or a proxy nation to shift the deci-
sion-making process to the 54-member Coun-
cil. Again, although the judgment is dependent
upon a majority rather than a consensus deci-
sion, the forum of the ECOSOC would offer
the United States further opportunities to
create and exploit issue linkage. 
In light of both the cultivation issue and the
obstacle-strewn route to re-scheduling, par-
ties may feel that the modification game isn’t
worth the candle. It would seem at first glance
that the amendment procedure offered by
Article 47 of the Single Convention is a more
cost-effective route. As with modification,
however, the amending route provides plen-
ty of scope for blocking action by a nation
opposed to revision of the regime. The cen-
tral role played by the ECOSOC in the
process would again permit the US to take
advantage of issue linkage. 
Amending the Single Convention involves par-
ties notifying the Secretary-General of a pro-
posal for an amendment, including the rea-
soning behind the move. The Secretary-Gen-
eral then communicates the proposed amend-
ment and the reasons for it to the Parties and
to the Council. It is then the ECOSOC’s deci-
sion to either call a conference to consider
the amendment, or ask the parties if they
accept the amendment. If no party rejects the
amendment within 18 months after circulation
by the Council, the amendment comes into
force. This outcome would appear to be most
unlikely with the US stance on the mainte-
nance of the regime beyond doubt.  If, as is
more probable, one or more parties reject
the amendment and submit to the ECOSOC
their comments within 18 months, the Coun-
cil can decide whether or not to convene a
conference to consider the amendment.
While such a conference, if it were to be held,
may be of use in raising the profile of the revi-
sion issue, it would still be far from certain
that meaningful revisions would be made. It
is also worth noting that, by virtue of the pow-
ers it holds from the Charter of the United
Nations, the Council may simply refuse to
make a decision on the proposal.7 There is
consequently no guarantee that an amend-
ment would ever even make it to the confer-
ence phase.
Clearly then, difficulties beset the options
available to create more room for manoeuvre
within the current regime. It is fitting that
much like the US legislative process, the UN
system is also vulnerable to blocking and often
characterised by gridlock. In order to cir-
cumvent such stasis, and yet remain within the
rules of international law, parties may consid-
er two other options: denunciation of the
treaties and the invocation of the principle of
primacy of national constitutions with specif-
ic regard to human rights. Both would provide
nations with legally valid opportunities to
withdraw from the treaties altogether.
Withdrawal from the Treaties  
Articles within all the treaties allow parties to
withdraw consent by depositing in writing a
denunciation with the Secretary-General.8
Although perhaps regarded as an extreme
move, action of this type, as the Canadian
LeDain Commission noted thirty-years ago,
“…would not, of course, be in violation of interna-
tional obligations” since it is written into the
treaties.9 It would undoubtedly, however,
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draw extreme criticism from the UN and the
US. As noted above, a party who chooses to
denounce the treaties would have to be pre-
pared to face not only US-UN condemnation
but also the threat or application of some
form of US sanctions. As Peter Andreas notes,
“Open defection from the drug prohibition regime
would…have severe consequences: it would place
the defecting country in the category of a pariah
‘narcostate,’ generate material repercussions in the
form of economic sanctions and aid cut offs, and
damage the country’s moral
standing in the international
community.”10 This would
create different problems
for different states. For
economic reasons, so-
called developed nations
are better placed to resist
US-UN pressure than
those from the so-called
developing world. 
Denunciation, nonetheless, opens up some
interesting possibilities. If a credible group of
parties from Europe, Australasia and Latin
America, for example, were to combine to
denounce one or all of the treaties, the US-
UN axis may lose much of its potential influ-
ence. The ‘denouncers’ may find safety in
numbers. Paradoxically, by moving to leave the
confines of the regime such a group might be
able to generate a critical mass sufficient to ini-
tiate regime change and thus create some
space for movement at the national level with-
in the current system. The UN apparatus and
the US might be more open to treaty modifi-
cation or amendment if it was felt that such a
concession would prevent the destruction of
the existing treaty system. This would differ
from the procedures to modify the treaties
discussed above since such a group would not
simply be playing the numbers game in an
effort to gain majority decisions in both the
Council or the Commission. A sufficiently
weighty ‘denouncers’ group may be able to not
only withstand UN-US pressure, but also apply
pressure itself. 
Alternatively, in view of the fact that members
of the group would have already broken free
from the regime, nations may feel sufficient-
ly confident to simply walk away from the
treaties. While theoretically possible it would
be highly unlikely that the denunciation route
could be employed to formally terminate the
treaties. For example,
as of January 2002 it
would require 138
nations to denounce
the 1961 Convention
and reduce the num-
ber of ratifications
below the 40 required,
in accordance with
Article 41, to bring it
into force. Nonethe-
less, depending upon
its composition, a group denunciation would
greatly weaken the regime without actually
requiring the ‘de-ratification’ of any of the
conventions. 
Should parties prefer not to follow the denun-
ciation route, they could exploit what Peter
Webster has called an “important loophole” in
the treaties.11 As Webster notes, the 1997,
UNDCP World Drug Report states:
“…[none of the] three international drug Conven-
tions insist on the establishment of drug consump-
tion per se as a punishable offence. Only the 1988
Convention clearly requires parties to establish as
criminal offences under law the possession, pur-
chase or cultivation of controlled drugs for the pur-
pose of non-medical, personal consumption, unless
to do so would be contrary to the constitutional prin-
ciples and basic concepts of their legal systems.”12
(emphasis added)
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International acceptance
of a US-inspired and
perpetuated global
blueprint for drug
prohibition is waning
fast.
Thus, if the highest courts in signatory nations
ruled that such prohibitive clauses with regard
to a single drug (cannabis for example) or a
selection of outlawed substances was uncon-
stitutional, then the parties involved would no
longer have to work within the limitations of
the Convention with respect to those drugs.
Such action would be perfectly legitimate
according to the provisions of the treaties
themselves. Debate already exists with regard
to the value of challenging drug prohibition on
the grounds of human rights violations.14 As
with all of the options discussed here, this
course of action would undoubtedly attract
massive criticism and more from the UN and
the US. Yet, as with the denunciation option,
a group of nations would more likely be able
to withstand pressure. Defection via this
route would again severely weaken the treaty
system and possibly act as a trigger for regime
change.
Disregarding the Treaties
Another strategy, as alluded to above, would
be for parties to simply ignore the treaties. In
this way, they could institute any policies
deemed to be necessary at the national level,
including for example the legalisation of
cannabis and the introduction of a licensing
system for domestic producers.  This option
has been gaining support amongst many sup-
porters of harm reduction for some time. Dis-
regarding the treaties, however, raises serious
issues beyond the realm of drug control. The
possibility of nations unilaterally ignoring drug
control treaty commitments could threaten
the stability of the entire treaty system. As a
consequence, states may be wary of opting
out. Some international lawyers argue that
subject to the principle of rebus sic stantibus
all treaties can naturally cease to be binding
when a fundamental change of circumstances
has occurred. This doctrine of changed cir-
cumstances can undoubtedly be applied to the
drug treaties. Yet, the selective application of
such a principle could call into question the
validity of many and varied conventions. 
This ‘collective responsibility for global order’
argument would, of course, be more persua-
sive were it not for the cafeteria approach to
international law adopted by world’s only
Superpower. The US withdrawal from the
Kyoto Treaty and repudiation of the ABM
treaty had already gone a long way to threat-
en the treaty system before its recent
announcement to ‘unsign’ itself from the con-
vention to establish an International Criminal
Court. In facilitating this unprecedented
move, the Bush II administration has assert-
ed that the US is also no longer bound by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Under the 1969 convention, a country that
has signed a treaty cannot act to defeat the
purpose of that treaty, even if it doesn’t intend
to ratify it.15 Thus, having set this precedent
on the basis of national interest, Washington
will surely find itself in an awkward position
vis-à-vis its opposition to any defection from
the drug control treaties on similar grounds. 
Conclusions
Nations wishing to expand national policy
space by operating beyond the confines of the
current global drug prohibition regime are
faced with several possible paths. These all
have their own problems and cannot be real-
istically considered without reference to the
US. 
The possibility for parties to successfully
modify the treaties is limited. Many opportu-
nities exist for nations that favour the status
quo, particularly the US, to block any move
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for re-scheduling or amending. A re-exami-
nation of the treaties may also provide pro-
hibition-oriented nations with the opportu-
nity to hijack proceedings and strengthen the
current regime. This may lead parties to seri-
ously examine various options for denuncia-
tion and withdrawal. As shown, a credible
alliance of nations would be better able to
withstand UN-US opposition than a lone
state. That said, levels of resilience would cer-
tainly differ between nations, depending upon
their economic status and relationship with
the US. The abandonment of many multilat-
eral treaties by the Bush II administration has
also re-opened debate on the efficacy of sim-
ply ignoring the drug conventions. If faced
with censure for defecting from the global
prohibition regime, parties will now be able
to argue that they are merely emulating the
habits of a hegemon.
It is clear that international acceptance of a
US-inspired and perpetuated global blueprint
for drug prohibition is waning fast. Yet, while
becoming increasingly isolated, the US, as
hegemon, still chooses to support the glob-
al drug prohibition regime. Here, the words
of Kettil Bruun, Lynn Pan and Ingemar Rexed
are as pertinent as ever. In their 1975, The
Gentlemen’s Club, they wrote, “The limits of
action in the drug field are, like in many other fields,
set by the lines of political relationships prevailing
in the world at large.”
David Bewley-Taylor*
* David R. Bewley-Taylor lectures at the Department of
American Studies of the University of Wales Swansea,
UK; he is the author of The United States and Internation-
al Drug Control, 1909-1997, Continuum, London, 2001.
REFERENCES
RECENT BOOKS
The past decade has seen an increasing polarisation
between divergent trends in global drug policies. On
the one hand, there has been an escalation in the US-
driven War on Drugs, which has created a drug gulag
domestically and increased and militarised forced
eradication abroad. On the other hand, in Europe and
several like-minded countries, a more flexible and
pragmatic approach has gained ground in domestic
drug policy-making, taking distance from indiscrimi-
nate repression and the zero-tolerance approach. In
these countries, the trend towards greater leniency
has become irreversible and rational thinking is grad-
ually replacing the dogmas of the past. Such tolerant
approaches have reached their legal limits within the
framework of the current UN Drug Conventions.
The result of the polarisation between the two main
trends is paralysis at the UN level. 
The 1998 United Nations General Assembly Special
Session (UNGASS) on Drugs was originally called to
evaluate the effectiveness of the current repressive
drug control regime, but early in the preparatory
phase the UNGASS was reoriented towards an affir-
mation of prohibitionism. Now, four years on, the
unrealistic targets and deadlines set for 2008 at the
UNGASS have proven, yet again, to be a failure. A
new opportunity for evaluation could open up when
the mid-term review of UNGASS takes place in
April 2003. 
This issue of Drugs & Conflict attempts to outline
the possibilities for a breakthrough in the current
impasse, which clearly lie only with some sort of
change to – or defection from – the current regime.
The US is anticipated to be the major obstacle but
its capacity to enforce the status quo is likely to be
undermined by the growing tension between its
multilateral responsibilities as hegemon and the
extent to which it has been demonstrating its desire
and material capability to act unilaterally.
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